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 The return of great-power friction and competition to the world’s oceans has initiated a good deal of self-reflection in naval and maritime circles. The 
U.S. Navy, in particular, has begun to reassess how it approaches the tactical and 
operational questions of establishing sea control during wartime. At the same 
time, the Royal Navy (RN) seeks to understand how Britain’s departure from the 
European Union will change its role in world affairs, and Japan continues to ad-
just its defense policies and the norms of its naval involvement in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. These are just a few of the shifting dynamics among the United 
States and its maritime allies.
A great deal of the official U.S. response to the developing power dynamics of 
the twenty-first century is focused on capability for conventional, or nation-state, 
warfare. Yet, concurrently with calls for developing greater lethality and greater 
high-end naval capability, observers have identified a second challenge: maritime 
conflict outside the boundaries of peer combat, or short of the threshold of high-
end warfare.
By looking to the maritime past and scuttling 
the idea that somehow the “gray zones” of 
today have initiated something unique to our 
contemporary world, naval forces will be better 
prepared to address the challenges presented 
by maritime security, naval irregular warfare, 
and great-power friction on the world’s oceans. 
In particular, an examination of America’s first 
postindependence conflict, the Quasi War with 
1
Armstrong: “Things Done by Halves”—Observations from America’s First Great-P
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 6 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
France, illuminates key questions for strategists and planners considering the 
interactions among great powers.
Our contemporary National Defense Strategy assures readers that the world 
has entered an era of renewed “great-power competition.” Unfortunately, much 
of the strategic and national-security writing that has adopted the phrase then 
immediately turns the discussion to the ability to conduct or deter peer-combat 
operations. Over centuries, however, maritime conflict short of declared war or 
open hostilities has been a fundamental part of the competition and maneuvering 
among powerful nations. Rather than looking only at our immediate past, or at 
most at the history of the post–world war era, strategists must open their aperture 
to a wider understanding of how the international dynamics of earlier eras might 
inform what great-power competition means for military and naval forces beyond 
great-power war. For the purposes of this article, debates over the theoretical 
and definitional constructions of gray zone, hybrid, asymmetric, and other labels 
are less important than seeking to understand how this history can inform our 
understanding of the present and our thinking about the future.1
Concepts surrounding the advancement of hybrid war or conflict in the 
gray zones—or whichever contemporary buzzword is a strategist’s or planner’s 
favorite—have developed from Russian activity in the Black Sea region and Chi-
nese activity in the South China Sea.2 Much of the writing implies that modern 
Russian, Chinese, and Iranian efforts have introduced something new to the 
maritime world. Admiral James G. Stavridis has written that “the fundamental 
idea of hybrid warfare is to find the space short of clear-cut military action with 
direct and recognizable tactical, operational, and strategic impact.”3 He suggests 
that the maritime versions of these conflicts will be conducted in the coastal or 
littoral regions of the world and will involve both naval “gray-hull” warships and 
civilian vessels. Other commentators have pointed out that the mixing of law-
enforcement responsibilities with more-traditional naval missions complicates 
the situation for naval planners who think in Mahanian terms of decisive sea 
battles or Corbett-inspired bombardment and power projection ashore.4 Despite 
the fact that some identify these hybrid or gray-zone conflicts and competition as 
a particularly complicated and somewhat unprecedented change to the maritime 
world, they actually are nothing new to naval history.
The very beginning of the history of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps is as 
good a place as any to take up an examination of unconventional conflicts, irreg-
ular operations, and great-power competition. The conflict between the United 
States and France from 1798 to 1800 was, after all, a maritime conflict, caused by 
great-power friction, that remained short of declared war. It led the U.S. Congress 
to form the Department of the Navy and to outfit and deploy U.S. warships for 
the first time. Originally known as “the war with France,” the conflict became 
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known more commonly in the twentieth century as the Quasi War, and the new 
nomenclature suggested its unusual and unconventional nature.5 By looking back 
on the U.S. Navy’s first conflict—an undeclared war that occurred in the gray area 
between peace and war, but resulted in both combat among nations and fighting 
against nonstate groups in a hybrid manner—observations emerge that may help 
today’s strategists and planners examine our modern challenges. Understanding 
the long history of American involvement in maritime operations short of de-
clared war will lead to better-informed questions to help us understand our con-
temporary challenges, and will help us develop twenty-first-century approaches.
A WAR THAT WAS NOT A WAR
Today, the history of the Quasi War is largely unknown to naval planners and 
national-security professionals. It also lacks a wide body of literature from aca-
demics and historians themselves. The Barbary Wars of early American history 
have attracted a cottage industry of recent publishing on the topic, from academ-
ics to Fox News hosts—even sportswriters. The bicentennial of the War of 1812 
also brought a wealth of recent scholarship on that declared war. In contrast, in 
the past half century there has been only a single book about the U.S. Navy and 
the Quasi War: Michael Palmer’s excellent Stoddert’s War. As a result, returning 
to the historical primary sources, alongside the work of Palmer and older and 
related scholarship, can offer a useful and generally unfamiliar case study for the 
twenty-first century.
The French Revolution was an enormous event in world history, with effects 
that rippled across oceans. In the still-infant United States, the uprising that 
overthrew and executed Louis XVI created both international and domestic 
political problems. Britain’s reinitiation, in the aftermath of the Revolution, of 
its intermittent eighteenth-century wars with France put the United States in the 
middle. The revolutionary government (known as the Directory) demanded that 
the United States fulfill its responsibility to France, in accordance with the alliance 
that had helped Americans win their own independence. However, President 
George Washington did not want the two great powers of Europe—each of which 
had constituencies and supporters in the United States—pulling the young nation 
into a war it could not afford, economically or politically. Instead, Washington 
followed a circuitous line of diplomatic reasoning to escape the alliance that had 
helped ensure his own victory at Yorktown. His administration, claiming that 
the country’s treaty had been with the recently guillotined Louis, explained that 
the alliance had died with the king, and that as a result the United States had no 
responsibility to support revolutionary France.6
The U.S. government tried to walk the fine line of neutrality, while at the same 
time American merchant traders set sail to carry supplies to both sides in the 
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conflict. American merchants knew that when great powers were at war they 
could make high profits carrying cargoes under a neutral flag.
The Directory, however, also realized Americans’ profit motives. Following 
Washington’s declaration of neutrality, the French abrogated the 1778 treaty with 
the United States. In doing so, it went beyond simply ending the alliance, also 
repudiating the treaty’s support for the American belief that “free ships make 
free goods.” This uniquely American ideal claimed that a neutral flag protected a 
ship from seizure regardless of whether the ship’s cargo constituted contraband 
of war. Instead, France returned to the traditional interpretation of maritime law, 
which believed that the destination of the cargo was what mattered in determin-
ing whether it was contraband and legal to seize, not who was carrying it.7 
The 1794 commercial treaty between United States and Great Britain, which 
became known as the Jay Treaty, was seen as yet one more insult to the French, 
who interpreted it as an effort by the Americans to assist the British enemy. 
The French accused American merchants of allying themselves with London, 
and privateers and warships sailing under the tricolor opened up a campaign of 
guerre de course (commerce raiding) against American ships in the Caribbean 
and western Atlantic.8 In June 1797, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering 
would report to Congress that French privateers and cruisers had captured 316 
American ships during the previous year.9 
After the election of 1796, Washington turned over the presidency to John Ad-
ams. In an attempt to negotiate a solution, the new administration sent a diplo-
matic mission to Paris. Instead of a diplomatic success, the negotiators came back 
with a story of solicitation of bribes and other covert dealings in what American 
newspapers called the XYZ Affair.10 
President Adams and Congress began putting the United States on a war foot-
ing.11 American political leaders authorized the final outfitting and deployment 
of the U.S. Navy’s first three frigates. They appropriated funds to finish building 
the second group of three frigates, whose construction an earlier Congress had 
halted to save money, in 1794. They authorized the president to buy or build a 
dozen small warships, of twenty-two guns or fewer. And finally, the legislature 
formed the Department of the Navy, under the leadership of the newly created 
Secretary of the Navy, to administer and lead naval operations against French 
depredations.12 However, Congress did not pass a declaration of war. The forces 
began to deploy in the summer of 1798, in what President Adams and Congress 
both considered a defensive measure. Between Congress’s first authorization for 
combat operations—ordering U.S. warships to engage armed French vessels in 
the early summer of 1798—and the Convention of 1800—which ended the con-
flict in September of that year—the U.S. Navy deployed dozens of warships into 
the Caribbean and western Atlantic.
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FOUR OBSERVATIONS
In today’s maritime and military concepts and jargon, those ships’ mission can 
be described quite accurately as carrying on a maritime hybrid conflict brought 
on by great-power competition. Studying the records of the nascent American 
naval force to examine how the ships operated during the Quasi War yields four 
observations about the experience and how the Navy and its leaders approached 
the conflict.
The remainder of this article will examine those four observations rather than 
continue a chronological retelling of the story of the war.13 These observations 
can help inform our understanding of how naval forces interact within the al-
leged “gray zones” and offer a starting point for considering hybrid maritime 
conflict in today’s era of great-power competition.
Presence Matters
Initially, the American warships deployed in 1798 patrolled only the nation’s 
coastlines, but it was only a matter of weeks before Secretary of the Navy Ben-
jamin Stoddert realized that these operations were insufficient—French ships 
were attacking American merchant ships not only on the coast but also far from 
their own shores.14 The French had established a privateering base, with supplies 
and a court for adjudicating prizes, on their colonial island of Guadeloupe in the 
Lesser Antilles.15 
With Adams’s approval, Stoddert deployed the first small squadrons of war-
ships into the Caribbean. Under the command of captains who were elevated 
to the largely honorary title of commodore while in command of multiship 
squadrons, these units patrolled the common transit routes, convoyed Ameri-
can merchant ships when they could gather them, and discovered and captured 
French privateers. The first cruises were relatively successful, especially for a 
naval service that had existed for only a matter of months. However, after several 
months of continuous operations the ships required maintenance and supplies, 
so commodores and their squadrons began returning home—whereupon the 
French privateers surged back out of the safe havens they had found to renew 
their attacks.16 
Despite how it appears when you draw a straight line on a map from the 
United States to the Caribbean, the Navy was operating far from home. Because 
of the prevailing winds and currents, in the age of sail a ship leaving Chesapeake 
Bay had to sail east into the Atlantic to find the winds that would allow it to tack 
back to the southwest toward the Caribbean. This route resulted in a passage that 
sometimes took American warships almost as long to get to the West Indies as it 
took them to reach Europe.
When reports of the renewed French attacks reached American newspapers, 
Stoddert and his commodores quickly realized that dealing with an adversary that 
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was using both state naval forces and privateers required constant presence.17 The 
squadrons appeared to work well when they were on station. However, the Navy 
could not wait for the first squadron to make it home before deploying a second. 
The gap in presence allowed privateering attacks to surge and the admiralty court 
at Guadeloupe to fill with cases as General Edme É. B. Desfourneaux, the French 
governor, issued more commissions for privateers and reinvigorated the guerre 
de course.18 
So Stoddert worked with President Adams to design a rotational deployment 
model for American squadrons. The secretary planned to order multiple squad-
rons to cover different parts of the Caribbean, and almost immediately he began 
preparing the new squadrons needed to replace them. Stoddert then issued the 
original commodores orders that forbade them to leave their stations until relief 
arrived.19
The American experience in the Quasi War revealed that in a hybrid conflict 
physical presence and patrolling constituted an important part of addressing the 
ebb and flow of the threat. The occasional appearance of a warship, to prove the 
simple possibility of presence, was insufficient; the number and types of adver-
sary efforts quickly adapted to a strategy that left the seas uncontested, or at least 
unpatrolled. The resulting solution was the U.S. Navy’s first use of rotational de-
ployments—a method that has become a hallmark of modern global operations. 
In the Quasi War, for the Navy to remain operationally and strategically effective, 
the secretary had to ask, “How do I maintain regular, physical presence?”
Multiple Adversaries
When the U.S. Navy initiated operations in the Caribbean in the summer of 1798, 
its leaders knew they would be facing at least two different adversaries.
The French Navy. France’s navy had a small but capable presence in the West 
Indies to patrol the country’s colonies and protect its trade. This force, at different 
points in the conflict, included several frigates, such as L’Insurgente, Volontaire, 
and La Vengeance. They were roughly equivalent in capability to the American 
frigates, although each ship was of slightly different size and had a slightly 
different armament. These vessels represented a conventional threat, and one that 
Americans had designed and armed their larger warships to be able to handle.20
French Privateers. But in addition to the French naval adversary were the French 
privateers. Varying widely in size, these ships deployed from French colonies in 
the Western Hemisphere to prey mostly on unprotected merchant ships from 
both the United States and Great Britain. Guadeloupe, located in the heart of the 
West Indies, was a primary base of operations.
The first privateer captured by an American warship was a typical example 
of the threat. In the summer of 1798, the American naval ship Delaware, a 
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6
 A R M S T R O N G  7 3
twenty-gun converted merchantman commanded by Captain Stephen Decatur 
Sr., confronted La Croyable off the coast of New Jersey. After a brief exchange 
of gunfire the French surrendered, because they thought their opponent was a 
British warship.21 The privateer was relatively small, with a schooner rig and a 
total burden of approximately one hundred tons. Armed with a dozen small (six-
pound) guns, it was strong enough to overtake any merchant ship, but the captain 
knew he would have a hard fight against a warship.22 
The rig and size of La Croyable, which generally matched the type built in 
the United States known as Baltimore clippers, became familiar throughout 
the nineteenth-century Caribbean as commerce raiders, not only as licensed 
privateers, with government-issued commissions, but also as pirates, engaged in 
maritime crime.23 These French privateers attacked hundreds of American ships, 
although exact numbers are hard to come by. In 1827, Henry Clay collected the 
records of 444 ships that were taken as prizes and brought into French ports, 
yet that total does not include an unknown number that simply were robbed of 
supplies, sunk, or burned without a French legal proceeding.24 The line between 
privateer and pirate could be blurry.
Insurgents. Congress authorized combat operations against any armed French 
vessel, whether a warship or a privateer. Yet as the American commodores began 
operating throughout the West Indies, they discovered that there were other ad-
versaries as well. In 1791, following news of the revolution in France, a slave revolt 
and black insurgency had erupted in the colony of Saint Domingue (known today 
as Haiti). Between 1791 and 1804, when Haiti declared its independence from 
France, its island was in a near-constant state of civil war and violence.25 Ameri-
can merchants wanted to trade with the island, but the instability made it difficult. 
The involvement of American merchants, despite initial government claims of 
neutrality in the island’s fighting, and the fact that Haiti was still ostensibly French 
pulled the U.S. Navy into the surrounding waters and embroiled its ships in the 
local fighting. Aligning themselves with the revolutionary François-Dominique 
Toussaint-Louverture (who sometimes returned his allegiance to France), Ameri-
can naval forces found themselves involved in operations against other factions 
both ashore and in the littorals around the island. Forces loyal to André Rigaud, 
who claimed to be fighting for France against Toussaint-Louverture, launched 
raiding attacks from shore with small boats on the southern coast of the island. 
Sometimes they sailed under the tricolor of France and sometimes under the red 
banner commonly flown by pirates in the West Indies. American warships found 
themselves in combat with both flags.26 
Other Threats. In the closing year of the conflict other threats popped up as well. 
The Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico began to involve themselves in the 
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turmoil in Caribbean waters. The United States, France, Great Britain, and local 
revolutionary forces all were pursuing their own agendas, and Spanish authorities 
did not want to be left out. Reports of Spanish privateering and pirate bases began 
to reach the American commanders, so they deployed ships along the Cuban 
coast to patrol against the new threat.27 
Thus, the commodores who commanded the American squadrons during the 
Quasi War did not have the luxury of contending with a single naval adversary. 
The French navy certainly posed the greatest danger in ship-versus-ship combat, 
but French privateers perpetrated the bulk of the attacks on American shipping 
and were the most important target of American operations. Yet despite the clear 
congressional direction toward French forces, the commodores and leaders in 
Washington could not ignore the civil war raging in Haiti, the insecurity it caused 
in the maritime world, and the threats of other great powers entering the fray. 
Initially, it seemed clear that America’s adversary was “the French,” but as the 
conflict developed and introduced other threats American leaders had to ask the 
question “Who are our adversaries, and what do they really want?” if they were 
to come up with operationally and strategically effective plans.
Keeping an Eye on Allies and Partners
U.S. naval forces discovered that they had numerous adversaries in the Carib-
bean. However, they also could count on a number of potential partners in their 
conflict with revolutionary France.
Toussaint-Louverture. While the Haitian leader appeared to present more 
demands than offers of assistance, Toussaint-Louverture and his forces regularly 
shared information and intelligence with American naval commanders and 
diplomats. The civil war raged in Haiti among groups that at various times 
received backing from British, Spanish, French royalist, and Directory forces. 
At the start of the conflict between the United States and France, Toussaint-
Louverture had pushed back effectively against British and Spanish attempts to 
gain control of Haiti. President Adams saw the opportunity to reestablish the 
profitable commercial connections that Americans had had with the island 
previously while encouraging Toussaint-Louverture to maintain the separation 
between his territory and the government in Paris. The Americans, the British, 
and Toussaint-Louverture signed a secret three-way alliance in June 1798, just as 
the first American warships deployed into the Caribbean.28
The relationship with Toussaint-Louverture and Haiti was a conflicted one 
for the Americans. The fighting on the island, and with it the possibility that 
France would lose control of its most valuable colony in the Western Hemisphere, 
was clearly a positive development for American interests. The territory that 
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Toussaint-Louverture held at Cap-Français (now Cap Haitien) and Port-au-
Prince offered places for American ships to obtain supplies such as food and fresh 
water. And American merchants made sure the Navy and politicians understood 
the future commercial benefits.29 
But the Haitian Revolution also was a movement that started with a slave re-
volt. The racial politics of the era created massive fear that the revolution in Haiti 
would lead to unrest within the slave populations of states such as Georgia and 
the Carolinas. This fear was not unwarranted, since a Haitian veteran eventually 
would play a role in the “German Coast Uprising” in Louisiana in 1811.30 There 
also was a more desperate concern: that the French might launch an invasion of 
the Southern American states using black troops, with the goal of fomenting a 
full-fledged slave revolution.31 Yet despite the concerns of politicians and South-
erners back home, American naval commanders in the Caribbean realized that 
even an imperfect partnership could be beneficial, so they continued to work with 
Toussaint-Louverture and his army.
Britain. The most powerful partner with which the United States worked dur-
ing the Quasi War was the world’s dominant naval power: Great Britain. There 
still were plenty of bad feelings between the two nations, which had gone their 
separate ways barely more than a decade prior. Yet both were fighting revolution-
ary France, and many of their interests in the Caribbean appeared to coincide, 
as witnessed by the joint secret pact with Toussaint-Louverture. During the first 
summer of American operations, Secretary Stoddert and Vice Admiral George 
Vandeput, who commanded British naval forces on the North America station, 
created a shared set of codes and signals that allowed American and British cap-
tains to communicate and coordinate their efforts.32 At the start, the partnership 
appeared to be a solid one, as the Navy Department distributed the signal book 
and the commodores became aware of the common cause in Haiti. American 
merchant ships sometimes sailed in convoys under British protection, and the 
two nations’ warships passed intelligence to one another.33 
However, it was not long before the relationship began turning sour, at least 
occasionally. In the middle of November 1798, the American sloop of war 
Baltimore (twenty-four guns) was escorting a convoy of merchant ships along 
the north coast of Cuba toward Havana. As the convoy neared its destination 
lookouts called out several sail on the horizon, and a squadron of British warships 
approached. The squadron’s flagship, the ship of the line HMS Carnatic, hailed 
Captain Isaac Phillips aboard Baltimore. Commodore John Loring asked him 
to come aboard the British ship to consult, and the American officer crossed 
in a boat. Phillips then was surprised when Loring refused to acknowledge his 
papers and instead ordered a press-gang aboard Baltimore and the other ships 
9
Armstrong: “Things Done by Halves”—Observations from America’s First Great-P
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 7 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
of the convoy. The Royal Navy removed fifty-five seamen from the ships who 
they alleged were British subjects. Although about half eventually were returned, 
when the British sailed off they left Phillips impotent and embarrassed. Not long 
after, Secretary Stoddert relieved him of command.34 
Cooperation and conflict ebbed and flowed between the Americans and the 
British throughout the war. Washington continued to receive reports of British 
assistance to American merchants, and the passing of intelligence between war-
ships remained a regular occurrence.35 However, there continued to be occasions 
on which the interests of the two nations diverged, including incidents of im-
pressment and the occasional capture of American merchant vessels.36 
One of the most dramatic examples occurred on the island of Curaçao, a 
Dutch colony, in the closing month of the conflict. In September 1800, French 
forces launched an invasion of Curaçao by landing over a thousand troops, 
who marched on the primary town, Willemstad. The port did heavy trade with 
American merchants, and there were many American ships in the harbor as the 
French approached.37 The U.S. warships Merrimack and Patapsco arrived to help 
protect American interests, and the British sent the frigate HMS Nereide to ensure 
that the French did not take control of the island. The Dutch initially appeared 
ready to concede to the French, but with the arrival of the Anglo-American 
naval forces and the subsequent landing of marines and sailors to strengthen the 
defenses, they stood to fight the French attack. The two smaller American ships 
positioned themselves so their guns could support the town’s small fortifications, 
and the combined force successfully repulsed the attack, leading the French to 
withdraw from the island.38 
After the end of the combined defense, the American ships reembarked their 
Marines and sailors and set off to patrol around the island to try to capture some 
of the retreating French ships. While the Americans were gone, Captain Fred-
erick Watkins landed British forces and annexed the town for Great Britain. He 
placed seven American ships in quarantine under British control, took custody of 
all the gold and cash of the American merchants in Willemstad, and sent orders 
for RN ships to seize all American vessels in nearby waters. Watkins’s percep-
tion of British interests appeared to outweigh both his promise to the American 
captains that he would protect American merchants and any appreciation for the 
American contribution to the recent joint defense of the island.39
Alliances and partnerships are always a complicated part of military and naval 
operations. In maritime conflicts short of declared war, awareness of the motives 
and intentions of friends can be just as important as understanding adversaries. 
Because these conflicts rarely appear existential, and because they remain below 
many nations’ threshold of what they consider war, members of defensive 
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alliances can be conflicted over their responsibilities to one another. The result 
is that while multiple nations may become involved in the same conflict, they do 
it for mixed reasons and with mixed rules of engagement. This may result in a 
situation counterproductive to American interests.
In the Quasi War, Secretary Stoddert and his commodores discovered that 
the partnership with Toussaint-Louverture produced both operational and 
political limitations, alongside its local benefits. They also experienced a complex 
relationship with the Royal Navy in the West Indies. As a result, during the Quasi 
War American leaders repeatedly had to ask the question “What are my partner’s 
motives, and do we have the same goals?”
The Role of Fleet Architecture
Congress founded the Department of the Navy to manage, organize, and command 
the Navy for the Quasi War with France. In the opening month of the conflict, the 
House and the Senate began authorizing the funds to build up the fleet. They 
started with finishing the fitting out and commissioning of the first three frigates, 
funding the completion of the second three frigates (whose construction had been 
suspended to save money), and appropriating funds to build or buy a dozen ships 
of up to twenty-two guns each. The Navy also took command of the cutters of the 
Revenue Service, reflagging them as warships. The department aimed to obtain 
converted merchant ships that were on the larger size and could carry around that 
limit (twenty-two guns). Examples are Delaware and Baltimore, which the Navy 
generally classified as sloops of war. These were the first ships deployed.40 
What the commodores quickly discovered once they were on station, however, 
was that larger ships with deep drafts had operational limitations. The squadrons 
had to complete much of their required patrolling in archipelagic waters—the 
littorals and shallows of the Caribbean. The privateers that made up the vast 
majority of the French threat tended to have shallow drafts and fast schooner rigs, 
which made them maneuverable and harder to chase with a big, square-rigged 
warship. Instead of squadrons made up of a handful of large, strong ships, with 
an overwhelming firepower of thirty-six to forty-four guns, the commodores 
discovered that in their hybrid conflict they needed larger numbers of smaller 
combatants.
Two of the warships purpose-built for the Quasi War demonstrated the value 
of small combatants both in combat and in patrol and presence work. Built in 
Baltimore, the schooners Experiment and Enterprise put to sea in 1799. Approxi-
mately eighty-five feet long, with a draft of just nine feet and a small armament of 
twelve six-pound guns, Experiment first sailed with the squadron of Commodore 
Silas Talbot in the waters around Haiti.41 Generally the same size and with the 
same capabilities as the privateers it hunted but with a trained crew, Experiment 
made more captures than any other ship deployed that year. Henry Spencer built 
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Enterprise on lines similar to those of its sister ship, and the second schooner 
deployed a month after Experiment. In the ship’s first year of operations, its crew 
captured eight privateers and recaptured eleven American ships that the French 
had attacked and taken. These two small ships appeared more operationally ef-
fective than most of the frigates in the conflict. Commanded by aggressive young 
officers, they quickly made reputations for themselves, and the name Enterprise 
would enter American naval lore.42 
The commodores realized they had a problem with the architecture of their 
squadrons. They simply did not have enough small combatants to patrol their 
areas of responsibility properly. To address the problem, many of them began us-
ing ships they had captured as American warships. This solution was a relatively 
common practice of navies in the age of sail. For example, British captains regu-
larly purchased ships they had captured back from prize courts and called them 
“tenders” for their larger vessels. Placing a favorite junior officer in command 
with a handful of sailors from the larger ship, commanders deployed the tenders 
to patrol the littorals where the larger ship could not reach.43 
American commodores such as Silas Talbot and Thomas Truxtun began us-
ing this method to augment their forces. In early 1799, within days of Constella-
tion’s defeat of the larger French frigate L’Insurgente, Truxtun and his men also 
captured the privateers Le Diligente and L’Union off Guadeloupe. Truxtun took 
L’Union into American service and manned and deployed it as a tender to hunt 
more privateers.44 Talbot followed the same path in the spring of 1800 when 
when the Americans captured the French sloop L’Ampherite. Talbot renamed the 
small ship Amphitheatre and placed it under the command of a young Lieutenant 
David Porter, with orders that suspicious vessels “may be stop’d, and examined 
strictly, and brought to the Constitution if she is near to be found.”45 Talbot also 
used the American smuggler Sally, which his boats had captured along the beach 
on the north coast of Hispaniola, as a raider to attack the privateer Sandwich in 
the harbor of Puerto Plata.46 
The American commanders in the Quasi War discovered that a balanced 
architecture for their squadrons, including a range of capabilities in their ships, 
was important for prosecuting an irregular campaign successfully. This is not to 
claim that big warships, with the ability to conduct conventional naval battles, were 
unnecessary; on the contrary, Truxtun and Constellation’s battles with the French 
frigates L’Insurgente and Vengeance demonstrated that units deployed for hybrid 
conflicts must be able to participate in high-end naval combat when threatened.
However, the administration back in Washington was not happy with the 
commodores’ practice, and none of the tenders operated for more than a 
couple of months.47 But the success of purpose-built small combatants such 
as Experiment and Enterprise and the commanders’ desperate use of captured 
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vessels as tenders to expand the low-end capability of their squadrons suggest 
that in hybrid conflict a balanced force is vital to efficient operations.
CONSIDERING QUASI WARS
In his report to Secretary Stoddert on Constellation’s victory over L’Insurgente, 
Thomas Truxtun lamented the complex character of the operations he was leading. 
He wrote, “The french Captain tells me, I have caused a War with France, if so I 
am glad of it, for I detest Things being done by Halves.”48 Maritime great-power 
competition is complicated, rarely conforming to the popular image of great naval 
battles and other decisive moments on the sea. Despite many officers’ dislike of 
the circumstances, the very first U.S. armed conflict following independence was 
a maritime hybrid conflict conducted with a backdrop of great-power competition 
in the Caribbean. Close examination of the records of the conflict demonstrates 
a number of parallels and similarities to the challenges that have been identified 
in the study of irregular or hybrid conflicts and gray-zone operations in the 
twenty-first century. In their study of these similarities, today’s scholars, policy 
makers, and planners can start with four observations that might help guide their 
questions about modern maritime insecurity and complexity.
The leaders of the early American navy discovered the necessity for presence 
as an operating principle in maritime hybrid conflicts. Benjamin Stoddert, with 
President Adams’s concurrence, developed the first use of rotational deployments 
and other efforts to maintain physical presence. In the modern world, there is a 
temptation to view the virtual presence of air- and subsurface-based intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms as providing a technological solution 
for the twenty-first century. Yet the physical presence of surface combatants is 
likely to be just as important as it was two centuries ago, because it provides the 
maritime equivalent of what strategist Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie Jr., USN, 
described as “the man on the scene with the gun.”49 The possibility of a ship ar-
riving and the actual physical presence of one already operating in theater affect 
the adversary’s operational planning in fundamentally different ways. Virtual 
presence denotes actual absence.
The U.S. Navy struggles with this challenge in the twenty-first century. The 
occasional presence of American warships in the waters of the South China Sea 
sends important messages—but so does the absence of presence between those 
visits. In maritime regions that share many of the hallmarks of hybrid conflicts 
of the past, such as the Baltic or the South China Sea, regular naval presence has 
been hard to maintain; instead, episodic exercises and occasional patrols have be-
come standard. Strategists considering regions that have the potential to escalate 
into hybrid or quasi wars may benefit from considering the same issues regarding 
the maintenance of regular presence that Secretary Stoddert addressed.
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Early American naval leaders also discovered that hybrid conflicts usually 
offer up multiple adversaries. These adversaries typically have differing motives 
for their involvement in the conflict and employ different tactics or operating 
concepts. Planners must work actively to understand these differences if they 
are to prepare operations effectively. If they appreciate these divergences as a 
fundamental part of the maritime challenge, they even can use them as an op-
portunity. Recent developments of Yemeni rebels deploying coastal-defense mis-
siles raise these kinds of concerns. It is unclear whether the group that fired on 
USS Mason (DDG 87) and other American ships in October 2016 did so with the 
full knowledge of its proxy supporters.50 In the Quasi War, the French privateers 
frequently were more aggressive than the warships, and this complicated some of 
the Directory’s efforts to resolve the conflict. The government in Paris eventually 
recalled General Desfourneaux, the French governor at Guadeloupe, for being 
too antagonistic and aggressive toward the Americans. The maritime militias the 
People’s Republic of China has developed have the potential to impose similar 
complications on their alleged supporters and commanders.51 There is potential 
that the militias, operating under the assumption that People’s Liberation Army 
Navy forces will support them, will become more aggressive than their govern-
ment expects, and they may place China in an untenable position. American and 
allied planners must understand not only that this possibility exists but also how 
to identify it when it happens.
Likewise, partners and allies constitute a complicated element of hybrid conflicts. 
Just as with potential adversaries, most partners bring their own goals and their 
own limitations to a conflict. These sometimes will make cooperation difficult, and 
even may be counterproductive to American interests. This will be particularly 
true when neither side sees an existential challenge, but instead perceives a slow 
“salami slicing.” Balancing the differing interests of partners and allies will require 
just as much attention as understanding the motives of and differences among 
adversaries. U.S. interests already have experienced this challenge in recent years 
with the developments in the Philippines. Asking explicit questions about the 
interests of potential partners also raises important considerations about other 
nations, such as India or Vietnam, whose interests appear on the surface to match 
those of the United States but may not connect at a deeper political level. This 
truism may seem obvious when one reads it in an academic journal, but strategists 
and planners sometimes overlook it when they work from an American-centric 
view of the world and the country’s challenges, as issues of rules of engagement, 
caveats, and relationships from Afghanistan have shown.52 
Finally, the force architecture that commanders employ in the gray zone 
requires a hard examination of the capabilities available and the best way to 
balance the force employed. Large, powerful warships offer important deterrent 
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effects and address the challenges of survivability and force protection. However, 
they also tend to be inefficient and operationally limited when engaged in 
missions that fall short of war between major powers or ship-on-ship battles. 
Likewise, their expense results in smaller numbers, which adds to the presence 
challenge. Early American naval leaders were forced to recognize that small 
combatants are a vital part of the mix needed to address the myriad capabilities 
that hybrid adversaries may deploy. The large, forty-four-gun superfrigates 
such as Constitution were superior in a fight with other warships and eminently 
survivable; however, they had significant operational and acquisition limitations. 
Recent discussions of force architecture and fleet design in the U.S. Navy have 
focused on the big numbers—a 350-ship fleet, and how many large, powerful, 
guided-missile destroyers and globe-spanning aircraft carriers should be 
included.53 But if the U.S. Navy is going to prepare itself for the hybrid maritime 
conflicts of the future, it should remember the experience of the quasi wars of 
the past and recognize the insistent need for small combatants as a fundamental 
part of a balanced fleet.
In his Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Admiral John M. 
Richardson suggests that today’s challenges “will require us to reexamine our 
approaches in every aspect of our operations,” but he immediately goes on to 
remind sailors that “as we change in many areas, it is important to remember that 
there will also be constants.” The Chief of Naval Operations wrote that the best 
way to identify these constants and to balance them against the ever-changing 
character of conflict is to “[b]egin problem definition by studying history.”54 
While this call to historical context and wisdom appears fresh and new, Professor 
Andrew Lambert has written that the very founding of the academic discipline 
of naval history was “driven by the requirements of naval education, doctrinal 
development, and strategic reflection.”55 It is natural that, to understand our 
present, we should return to the maritime past.56 
History provides an important starting point for the examination of these 
kinds of challenges in the modern day. The suggestion that twenty-first-century 
threats are unprecedented or that consideration of them cannot be informed by 
experience does not stand up to critical scrutiny. However, it also is important 
to understand that there are limitations to historical analogy and the use of 
historical study in military strategy. Modern planners, policy makers, and naval 
officers will not find “school solutions” or easy answers derived from the study of 
America’s first maritime hybrid war. Instead, the observations that can be made 
from studying history may help refine the questions asked and the assumptions 
made, so as to develop better the underlying principles of a strategy or operational 
concept. As Alfred Thayer Mahan himself wrote, “The instruction derived from 
the past must be supplemented by a particularized study of the indications of 
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the future.”57 The character of war is ever changing, even if parallels continue to 
resonate, and historical study offers us ways to build frames of reference, context, 
and background knowledge.
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